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Summary 
• While the Eastern Partnership (EaP) only deepens the bilateral relations of the EU with its Eastern neighbours, its 
main contribution is the new multilateral framework designed exclusively for the ENP´s Eastern dimension.  
• It  is  the  EU  who  has  been  enthusiastic  about  the  multilateral  approach.  The  partner  countries  are  more 
restrained, citing two factors for their scepticism:  
(1) the fear that the EaP might gradually become an alternative arrangement to full membership and  
(2)  the worry  that multilateralism could decrease  the  so  far prevalent country‐specific differentiation and  thus 
slow down the quickest reformers.  
• The EaP´s multilateral framework has several major strengths:  
(1) the relatively simple and flexible “operational structure”,  
(2) the focus on regulatory reforms,  
(3) the introduction of the so‐called flagship initiatives, and 
(4) the increased involvement of civil society. 
• Among the potential problems, the most important are: 
(1) the launch of the EaP amidst growing political and economic instability across Eastern Europe, and 
(2) the financial resources which will not be sufficient in the long term given the ambitious work programme. 
• Regarding the four thematic platforms, they cover most issues on the agenda. But while some topics discussed are 
truly  multilateral  (e.g.  energy  cooperation),  others  are  predominantly  bilateral  and  their  inclusion  in  the 
multilateral framework is largely artificial (e.g. judiciary and public administration reforms). 
• Some of  the platforms with a  strong agenda  (such as energy  security) are growing  softer, hence  limiting  their 
relevance for both member and partner countries.  
• The  flagship  initiatives,  although  generally  sound  and  beneficial,  are  not  of  equal  standing  in  terms  of  their 
importance (cf. the  integrated border management and the support for small enterprises on the one hand, and 
the  underfinanced  reponsiveness  to  disasters  on  the  other).  In  addition,  one  important  originally  proposed 
initiative – the Southern Corridor – entirely disappeared from the agenda. 
• Two additional unresolved questions pertain  respectively  to  the EaP´s  relation  to  the other  regional  initiatives  
(BSS) and the participation of third countries.  
• The EaP has been doing well so far. Its long term success will be, however, dependent on four factors: 
(1) the continuous high‐level political support for the project in both the EU and the partner countries,  
(2) whether  there will be an unwavering  focus on  regulatory  reforms  that will prevent  the EaP´s multilateral 
framework from turning into an irrelevant talking club,  
(3) achievement  of  some  visible  successes  in  areas  like  energy  security,    border management  or  institution 
building (CIB), 
(4) the increase in funding available for the EaP after 2013. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Ever since the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in Prague in May 2009, its 
added value to the European Neighbourhood Policy has been hotly discussed. Some analysts 
claim that the EaP has been so successful that it has virtually eclipsed the ENP and that the 
EaP´s arrival heralds a final farewell to a unified approach to Eastern and Southern neighbour 
countries. Others take the opposite stance and argue that the EaP does not present a 
qualitatively new situation in the EU´s relations with its neighbourhood and that the ENP 
remains the main vehicle for EU´s neighbourhood policy.  
There is, however, one point on which both sides agree and that is the fact that the EaP 
finally introduced a multilateral element into the policy which had been so far limited to 
regional fora, which, however, do not include all six of the partner countries (the Northern 
Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy). The main aim of this paper is, therefore, to explore 
this newly introduced element and to assess its weaknesses and strengths. Since more than 
half a year has passed since the EaP´s inauguration, the second aim is to compare the 
commitments and expectations reflected in the three main documents dealing with the EaP 
(the Commission´s Communication on Eastern Partnership from December 2008, its working 
document on the EaP from the same month, the European Council Conclusions from March 
2009, and the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit) with the practical 
implementation thereof.  
The paper will proceed in five steps: After this introduction, it will discuss the general 
context of the EaP´s introduction. Then it will proceed to the assessment of its multilateral 
framework as it was proposed in the official documents on the EaP. In the next step, the paper 
will undertake a preliminary exploration of the implementation of this framework and it will 
conclude with some observations about the future evolution of the EaP. 
 
 
2. General context 
The EaP is a product of a double dissatisfaction: Among EU member states, there has 
always been a visible group of countries which have never put up with the official position of 
the European Commission that the ENP is in no way connected to the possibility of future 
enlargement. The creation of an umbrella policy that included both the Eastern and the 
Southern neighbours further weakened the link between the relations to the neighbours and 
accession since for the Southern neighbours, accession has been explicitly ruled out. At the 
same time, those member states keen on promoting closer ties with Eastern Europe have 
always skilfully insisted on the need to differentiate between “the neighbours of Europe” and 
“the European neighbours”. This insistence has met mixed results, but its greatest and newest 
achievement is undoubtedly the EaP since, while aiming only at the East, it transfers to the 
policy many instruments and mechanisms which have been used in the enlargement process. 
Thus the link between the neighbourhood policy and the policy of enlargement has been 
recovered. 
The second dissatisfaction did not arise from among EU member states, but among the 
Eastern partners. Some of them, notably Ukraine, were quite vocal in their scathing critique of 
the ENP. Although the list of alleged weaknesses of the ENP as seen by the diplomacies of 
the partner countries was long, the most frequently raised point was – obviously – the missing 
membership perspective. While the EaP does not alter the fundamental approach of the EU, it 
certainly takes the edge off the critique since it puts a foot in the door to the EU, which is 
famously “neither open, nor closed”, thus making it considerably more difficult for the EU to 
keep the Eastern partners outside the Union in the long term. 
At the same time, the current situation is not at all conducive to a quick integration of 
the partner countries in the EU. First and foremost, virtually all partner countries suffer from 
serious domestic political problems. The euphoria surrounding the Rose and Orange 
Revolutions has long faded away and instead, disillusionment dominates the scene and the 
backsliding in democratic reforms is difficult to ignore. It is noteworthy that the problems 
with internal political stability have recently hit the three “shoo-ins” of the EU – Ukraine, 
Moldova, and Georgia. Secondly, most partner countries have seriously suffered from the 
global economic crises, with Ukraine tumbling on the verge of the abyss of state bankruptcy. 
All in all, the membership ambitions of the partner countries are currently at their lowest ever 
since the introduction of the ENP in 2003-2004.  
Equally sobering is the fact that the two more specific goals frequently mentioned by 
diplomats from the partner countries – free trade and visa-free travel – seem today almost as 
far away as the membership itself. The shift from the original allusion to “visa free travel” to 
the weaker notion of “visa liberalisation” in the Prague Declaration is just one example of the 
fear of many EU members of uncontrolled migration from the East. In a similar vein, the 
feasibility studies on the so-called “deep free trade areas” in most cases came to the 
conclusion that the partner countries are not – and for a long time will not be – ready for full 
trade liberalisation with the EU.  
It is a certain irony that the situation with which the EU and its Eastern neighbours are 
confronted is, on the one hand, characterized by the presence of a new and relatively 
ambitious project aiming at their deeper integration, and, on the other, marked by a growing 
number of serious problems which could tarnish the chances the EaP offers. It is therefore 
high time for the EU to give a clear sign to the partners that these problems will not diminish 
the EU´s support for the policy and its will to substantially deepen the EU´s relations with the 
partners.  
 
 
3. The Eastern Partnership and multilateralism 
No matter how innovative the EaP is, the basic coordinates of the ENP remain 
unaltered: The relations between the EU and the partner countries are still predominantly 
bilateral and the focus on action plans which specify the areas of regulatory integration also 
remains intact. Especially for Ukraine, the EaP does not bring anything substantially new; 
instead it simply transfers the experience from the EU-Ukrainian cooperation to the other 
partner countries. The only major difference introduced by the EaP is thus its multilateral 
dimension. 
The multilateralisation brought about by the EaP is a logical and widely expected step. 
While the Southern dimension has for a long time been sufficiently institutionalised (and 
some would argue that its focus on institutions was excessive), the Eastern regional equivalent 
was missing from the ENP. The notion of differentiation that was so far anxiously interpreted 
by the European Commission as the differentiation between individual countries was thus, 
with the arrival of the EaP, finally broadened to include inter-regional differentiation as well. 
This is not to say that differentiation of this kind was previously absent from the policy – for 
example, the financial balance between the South and the East has always been closely 
followed. But the practical differentiation finally spilled over to political documents, 
signifying a formalisation of the differences between the South and the East. 
 At the same time, the partner countries have felt quite uneasy about the new 
multilateral element for several reasons. The most important of them has probably been the 
fear that the forum might turn into a stable institution that would become an alternative 
arrangement to EU membership. Second, the region is plagued by strong inter-state rivalries. 
The would-be champions fear that the others could slow them down (which is the 
predominant view in Ukraine towards Moldova, in Moldova toward the Caucasian countries, 
and in Georgia towards Armenia and Azerbaijan). Unfortunately, these worries are often 
corroborated in practice since the Commission´s preference of the bloc approach sometimes 
causes unnecessary delays. For instance, the dispute about the flights between Azerbaijan and 
northern Cyprus caused an interruption in EU negotiations with all three of the Caucasian 
countries. Needless to say, some states have nourished an even deeper mistrust of other 
partner countries because of the still unresolved frozen conflicts (Armenia and Azerbaijan). 
All in all, it seems that the multilateral element is assessed very positively by the EU, whereas 
the position of the partner countries is more restrained. 
 Even though the official documents concerning the EaP list many reasons for the 
creation of the multilateral framework of the EaP, ranging from information sharing to the 
facilitation of joint activities, the key element is succinctly summarised in the following 
quotation from the Commission´s communication from 3 December 2008: “The proposed 
multilateral framework will provide the setting for the systematic organisation of dedicated 
sessions involving the relevant European Commission services and, where appropriate, 
Member State experts, devoted to the presentation and explanation of the EU legislation and 
standards as well as its comparison with national policy and legislation. In this way the EaP 
will initiate a structured approximation process.” The interpretation of the integration of the 
East European partner countries with the EU in terms of regulatory reforms, which has always 
been central to the ENP, has thus received another boost. It will be the efficiency (or a lack 
thereof) of the afore-mentioned “structured approximation process” that will decide about the 
overall success of the multilateral framework.  
 In the evaluation of the multilateral framework, we should distinguish the assessment 
of the proposals contained in the official documents and their practical implementation. As far 
as the first is concerned, the overall judgment is quite positive. Next to the focus on 
multilateral regulatory reforms, the multilateral framework as proposed has three additional 
strengths and one weakness. The first strength lies in its relatively simple “operational 
structure”, which provides for both high-level political support and a sufficient number of 
expert meetings ensuring its practical impact. The structure consists of four levels – a summit 
meeting every two years, annual meeting of foreign ministers, biannual meetings of “thematic 
platforms” and the even more frequent meetings of supporting working panels. More to that, 
the Commission indicated its preparedness to modify this structure if need be, thus showing a 
surprising level of flexibility. Another dose of flexibility and openness is added to the EaP by 
the possibility that every participating country can launch new initiatives within its 
framework.  
The second strong point is the introduction of flagship initiatives that address some 
pressing issues (such as energy efficiency) that are essentially multilateral and, at the same 
time, of common concern for partner countries and EU member states alike. The flagship 
initiatives also carry the potential to rise over the technical work of the thematic platforms and 
become what their name implies - flagships that will gain attention in the national media and 
so increase the general visibility of the EaP.  
The third strength is related to the ability of the EaP to involve not only the 
governments of the partner countries, but to also get their civil societies onboard. As 
demonstrated by the Civil Society Forum in Brussels in November 2009 (as well as the 
meeting at the margins of the summit in Prague in May), the civil societies in these countries 
are small and hard pressed in the search for funding, but their contribution to the success of 
the EaP cannot be overestimated. The NGOs often work as allies of those wishing for quicker 
reforms, writing their own independent assessment reports, which is a development which 
should be undoubtedly promoted.  
The weak spot of the multilateral dimension of the EaP is, perhaps not surprisingly, its 
insufficient funding. For the period of 2010-2013 600 million Euros are earmarked for the 
EaP. However, only 350 million Euros will be spent on the multilateral part. In addition, since 
the funds are not spread evenly over the four years, only 85 million Euros are available for 
2010. Given the ambitious work programmes of the thematic platforms and the broad scope of 
the flagship initiatives, the financial support is clearly inadequate compared to the project´s 
ambitions and the partners´ expectations. The project is underfinanced not only in absolute 
terms, but also when compared to the means going to other EU neighbours. For example, as 
some analysts already noted, the pre-accession assistance to Turkey during a comparable time 
period will be five times bigger than the whole EaP budget.  
 
 
4. The implementation of the EaP multilateral framework 
 The analysis of the EaP´s implementation must necessarily start with the cautionary 
remark that it is still far too early to come up with a comprehensive assessment of its 
successes and failures. Especially in the multilateral framework, some projects have been 
launched only in December 2009, and others are expected to start during the first quarter of 
2010. Yet a preliminary assessment of the framework´s functioning is already due.  
 Regarding the four policy platforms (1. democracy, good governance, and stability; 2. 
economic integration and convergence with EU policies; 3. energy security; and 4. contacts 
between people), the first round of meetings took place in June 2009 with the first 
presentations of the EC´s proposals alongside the EC-proposed priorities of actions. The 
second round of meetings was held in November 2009. Here, “core objectives” and “work 
programmes” were adopted.  
 The comparison of the platforms´ working is complicated by three factors: First, some 
platforms discuss much more pressing and substantive issues than others. To give just one 
positive example, in the platform on energy security, discussions have already started on 
concrete proposals to increase energy security and predictability. Among the discussed issues, 
the Energy Community Treaty and the accession to it of Ukraine, Moldova and possibly also 
Georgia stands out. Other sensitive but vitally important issues include the establishment of 
an early warning mechanism and, even more importantly from a long term perspective, the 
possibility of information sharing concerning major energy investments, which is a topic that 
remains unresolved among EU member states as well. The same can be said about the most 
important platform – economic integration and convergence with EU policies.  
 The second problem is related to the fact that it is sometimes entirely unclear why 
some activities are categorised as multilateral. For instance, the work programme for 2009-
2011 of thematic platform 1 (good governance) dedicates a lot of attention to the reforms of 
judiciary and the public administration. These can no doubt be discussed multilaterally, but 
the process itself and the reforms as such have no multilateral dimension and must be 
implemented only domestically. True, the exchange of best practices and experts is useful but 
this seems to be the only added value in some parts of the platforms. Other platforms and 
other topics are much more multilateral in essence; this pertains to energy security, people-to-
people contacts, environmental issues and many other topics. To put it bluntly, the former 
seem to be an artificial multilateralisation of principally domestic issues while the latter cover 
those areas that are multilateral in themselves. It remains to be seen whether the first 
(especially platform 1) will bring some added value beyond what has already been achieved 
bilaterally. 
 Third, compared to original expectations, some platforms have been weakened during 
recent months. For instance, the original focus of platform 3 on energy security has been 
gradually moving from issues related to hard security to a softer interpretation thereof. 
Environmental security is undoubtedly a welcome ingredient of the platform´s focus, but the 
focus on environment should not be seen as a replacement of discussion about energy 
diversification but its complement.  
 Regarding the flagship initiatives, their introduction is certainly laudable. Yet some 
problems arise here as well. First of all, while some initiatives are well chosen and have a big 
potential in terms of accelerating the partners´ growth and increasing the regional stability, the 
relevance of others is nigh negligible. Integrated border management and the support for 
small and medium-size enterprises are good illustrations of the first type, whereas prevention 
of and response to disasters is an embodiment of the second. Ironically, the EC further 
decreases the importance of the last initiative by assigning a puny 6 million Euros for it. One 
flagship initiative that was originally proposed – the Southern Corridor – has entirely 
disappeared. Even though on the practical level this may be related to the dissatisfaction of a 
partner country with the initiative, it nonetheless demonstrates the general shift from “hard” 
energy security we have discussed above.  
 Another problem is that even the potentially very useful initiatives are difficult to 
assess since so far all of them remain on a general level. The saying "The devil is in the 
detail" is particularly suitable for the analysis of these initiatives. For instance, it is 
noteworthy that the flagship initiative on integrated border management connects the project 
with the Union´s previous efforts in Southern Caucasus and speaks of the replication of past 
successful initiatives, such as the EUBAM mission in Moldova. However, it is not clear at all 
at the current moment how the experience of EUBAM could be transferred to the hot spot of 
the Eastern neighbourhood, Georgia´s secessionist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Unlike in the Transnistrian conflict, the two regions are not surrounded by ENP partner 
countries but supported by Russia instead, and the EU itself is divided on how (and whether) 
to engage in the conflict solution. In addition, some projects, for instance, projects on 
environmental governance and small and mid-sized enterprises, will be launched only in 
2010. Hence, their thorough assessment would be clearly premature. 
 Another difficult issue is the connections and overlaps both within and without the 
EaP´s multilateral framework. Internally, there is a substantial overlap between some 
activities of the thematic platforms and the flagship initiatives (regarding environment, energy 
efficiency, etc.). Again, an evaluation will be possible only when the functioning of these 
projects settles down and the potential clashes either subside or come to the fore. What is 
more serious is the external overlap of the EaP with the Black Sea Synergy. The Commission 
has been careful to stress the “complementarity” of the EaP and the Synergy on every 
occasion, but the statements never explain the concrete mechanisms or division of labour 
between the two. For instance, speaking about environment, the Commission does not say 
more than “coordination with the Black Sea Synergy will be ensured”. The talk about 
coordination and complementarity, however, cannot hide the obvious fact that the two 
projects compete on many fronts – both in substance (covering many identical areas – good 
governance, energy, transport, etc.) and in terms of finances.   
 The comparison with the Black Sea Synergy brings to the fore the final difficult issue 
– the role of third countries in the multilateral framework. These countries could be regional 
powers (Russia, Turkey), “neighbours of the neighbours” such as Central Asian countries or 
extraregional donor countries (USA, Japan, Canada, etc.). The Commission´s position is that 
third countries may be invited to participate in some projects on an ad hoc basis. But how 
often this will be the case remains to be seen. Also, since a consensus of 27+6 is required, the 
involvement of Russia, for instance, seems quite improbable for the time being. At the same 
time, while generally supporting the involvement of Russia in some projects, EC officials are 
inclined toward a negative stance towards Russia´s involvement in the thematic platforms. A 
different, but closely related, unknown variable pertains to the question whether Russia, 
Turkey and some other countries would be willing to take part in these projects. Given the 
negative remarks about the EaP by Kremlin´s high ranking diplomats and the worries in 
Turkey that the country might end up in a regional initiative instead of in the EU, doubts 
about the viability of this abound.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The EaP is a project that finally formalises the ever more palpable regionalisation of 
the ENP. Although the EaP does not change the overwhelmingly bilateral nature of the policy, 
it adds a strong multilateral element. While the basic operational structure, including regular 
meetings on all levels, is sound and the flagship initiatives are well chosen, the project´s 
future success is not guaranteed. The EaP is plagued by a number of problems, both EU-
internal and external. 2009, the year of the EaP´s inauguration, was a year of a deep economic 
crisis and growing political instability in the Eastern neighbourhood. This, together with the 
well-known reservations of the partner countries vis-a-vis the multilateralisation of the policy, 
makes predictions about the EaP´s future evolution highly unreliable.  
At the same time, there are reasons for optimism as well. Compared to other initiatives 
in the region (the Black Sea Synergy) as well as the multilateral forums in the Mediterranean, 
the EaP seems to be more efficient, more flexible and more ambitious at the same time. 
Interestingly, the partner countries that have never fully embraced the ENP (Ukraine) tend to 
see the EaP in a more positive light and the principle of joint ownership that never translated 
into reality with the ENP might finally come to fruition in the EaP. Some new elements, such 
as the Comprehensive Institution Building programmes, have also been well-received in the 
partner countries. 
All in all, there are four basic criteria upon which we can judge the success of the EaP, 
and in particular the success of its multilateral framework. The first and most important is the 
question of continuity, the ongoing political support of the EaP by both the EU and the partner 
countries. Given the difficulties in those partner countries that are most enthusiastic about EU 
integration as well as the multiplicity of interests inside the EU, this will be no easy task. On 
the other hand, the EaP is certainly more attractive and offers more incentives than the ENP, 
thus motivating them strongly to pursue a path to reforms. Second, the multilateral framework 
should not shed its regulatory focus. Only if the thematic platforms remain connected to the 
domestic reform processes in individual partner countries will the framework remain relevant 
and useful without turning into a mere talking club. Third, the EaP needs some visible 
successes. For this, some of the flagship initiatives are most suitable, in particular those 
related to energy security and efficiency. Fourth, the financial support for the EaP will have to 
be increased in the future. Even though it is understandable that under current conditions the 
EU is in no mood to increase its external expenditures, the EaP´s long-term ambitions cannot 
be satisfied without a substantial increase of financial resources for the period beyond 2013.  
 
 
